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BAD FAITH: DEFINING APPLICABLE
STANDARDS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ROYAL
GLOBE v. SUPERIOR COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
Bad faith litigation has developed extensively over the
past twenty-five years in California, where the courts have
been the pace-setters in the development of insurance law.
California has led the way in expanding the scope of liability
of insurance companies. In 1957, a California court of appeal
first recognized that an insured has a cause of action against
an insurance company for its bad faith refusal to accept an
injured claimant's offer to settle a personal injury lawsuit
against the insured.1 The California Supreme Court affirmed
this reasoning in a later decision which held that an implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every in-
surance contract and may require the insurer to settle a claim
against its insured, even though the express terms of the pol-
icy do not impose such a duty.2
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court.' Royal Globe held that a third party claimant could
sue an insurance company directly for the insurer's bad faith
settlement of the third party's claim against the insured.4
This unprecedented decision startled the insurance industry.
Previous cases holding an insurance company liable in bad
faith were based on contract and tort principles which re-
quired the insurer to act in the best interests of its insured.6
Royal Globe, however, was based upon the Unfair Settlement
Practices Act of the California Insurance Code." The resulting
c 1983 by William J. Casey.
1. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
2. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
3. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1976).
6. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-90.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1983). [hereinafter cited as
the Act]. Section 790.03 provides in pertinent part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition
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and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims
settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts of insurance policy
provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon com-
munications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance
policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable
time after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submit-
ted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and eq-
uitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts
due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the
amount ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when
such insureds have made claims for amounts reasonably similar to the
amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the
amount to which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled
by reference to written or printed advertising material accompanying or
made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which
was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured,
his representative, agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or benefi-
ciaries, upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has
been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the in-
surer of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claim-
ants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements of com-
promises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring
an insured, claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary
claim report, and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal
proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the
same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become
apparent, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy
coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the ba-
sis relied on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable
law, for the denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an
attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of
limitations.
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statutory cause of action based on section 790.03 of the Act7
deviates from the common law which prevented third parties
from directly suing an insurer without an assignment.8
The Royal Globe decision is presently the cause of many
problems for California attorneys. First, the primary difficulty
for insurers today in avoiding bad faith causes of action is un-
derstanding what constitutes bad faith in this new "statutory"
sense. Second, Royal Globe failed to articulate factors regard-
ing the stage at which the insurer's duty to settle arises.
Third, Royal Globe creates in the third party claimant a uni-
lateral weapon of demanding settlement without requiring of
the third party claimant the explicit good faith and fair deal-
ing requirements imposed upon insurers. Finally, Royal
Globe, in its interpretation of Insurance Code section 790.03,
raises a host of constitutional problems such as vagueness, the
right to a jury trial, and the right to contract.
This comment criticizes the Royal Globe decision by ex-
amining the development of bad faith law prior to and follow-
ing Royal Globe. Proposals to eliminate some of the problems
posed by the Royal Globe decision are as follows: first, the
common law principles of bad faith should control the Royal
Globe statutory cause of action; second, the assignment theory
should be used as the general procedure under which a third
party claimant must undertake to sue the insurer in accord
with the common law principles; and third, the concept of
mutuality in settlement obligations should be imposed on
third party claimants, so as to create parity between the par-
ties in the availability of sanctions arising from bad faith set-
7. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1983). Unless otherwise indicated, all
statutory references are to the California Insurance Code.
8. See, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 53 P.2d 584, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1976). "An assignment in law is the transfer or setting over of property, or
some right or interest therein, from one person to another." 7 CAL. JUR. 3d Assign-
ments § 1 (1973). In the context of this comment, assignment refers to the acquisition
by a third party of an insured's interest to sue an insurer for bad faith following the
completion of the initial lawsuit between the third party and the insured. The situa-
tion generally arises because of an insured's inability to pay the third party the dam-
age award above the insured's policy coverage. In exchange for the third party's cove-
nant not to execute on the judgment against the insured, the insured assigns the
rights to the third party to proceed against the insurer for a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Of course, the insured may proceed directly against the
insurer, by bringing a first party action in bad faith, as opposed to bringing a third
party action, in the case of an assignment. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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tlement negotiations from both third party claimant and the
insurer.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAD FAITH IN
CALIFORNIA
California initially employed a "good faith" standard to
evaluate an insurance company's liability for refusal to settle.e
Liability was not imposed upon the insurer if it fully, fairly,
and honestly considered, but rejected, settlement with the be-
lief that it could defeat the action against its insured, or at
least keep the final judgment within the policy limits. The ap-
parent deference afforded insurers, however, was short lived.
In 1957, a California court of appeal in Brown v. Guaran-
tee Insurance Co.,10 held that a bad faith breach of the duty
to settle, and not negligence, should be the basis of the in-
sured's cause of action. Brown set forth a group of objective
factors for subsequent determinations of whether the insurer's
refusal to settle constituted a bad faith breach." Brown was
the first case in California to utilize the doctrine of assign-
ment"2 in a bad faith action. Although Brown never specified
whether its holding was based on contract or tort principles, it
noted that the bad faith cause of action was nevertheless as-
signable even if based in tort. 3
Brown was followed by the California Supreme Court de-
cision, Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,'4
which held that "[tihere is an implied covenant of good faith
9. See Christian v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal.
1950).
10. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
11. Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75. These factors are as follows:
The strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and
damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to
a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circum-
stances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; the insurer's
rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to
inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk to
which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault
of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer
by misleading it as to the facts; and any other factors tending to estab-
lish or negate bad faith ...
Id.
12. See supra note 8.
13. 155 Cal. App. 2d at 693, 319 P.2d at 78.
14. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do
anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement."' 5 While subsequent cases have
held that the rejection of the claimant's initial settlement of-
fer could be sufficient to constitute a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 6 the insurer is not
liable in bad faith when the injured claimant has not made a
settlement offer to the insured. 7
Comunale was decided upon contract principles, although
the court noted that authority existed to support the theory
that wrongful refusal to settle had been treated as a tort. 8 It
took the court nine years, however, before it held in Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co. 19 that a bad faith cause of action may be
based on tort theory as well.
Crisci was a crucial development in the bad faith cause of
action because, under the general damages rule in tort, the
injured party may recover for all detriment caused, whether it
could be anticipated or not.20 No longer did the excess judg-
15. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. In Comunale the insured, after hitting plaintiffs
in a crosswalk with his truck, was notified by the insurer that the truck was not
covered under the policy. The insurer refused to settle within the alleged policy lim-
its, and judgment in excess of the policy limits was awarded to the plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs obtained an assignment of all of the insured's rights against the insurer and
brought suit for breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
16. See, e.g., Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr.
401 (1964). The Critz court held that:
Where the potential value of the claim is large in relation to the policy
limit, where the claimant's case is comparatively strong and the poten-
tial defendant's weak, rejection of an initial offer to settle at or near the
policy limit may then and there constitute a breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith.
Id. at 798, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The facts demonstrated what the court referred to as
"obvious liability." In addition to the insured driver having been on the wrong side of
the road, plaintiff Critz sustained injuries which included a fractured neck and jaw
and the loss of vision in one eye. The insured's policy was for $10,000. The jury re-
turned a $48,000 verdict in favor of plaintiff Critz. According to the court, the pru-
dent insurer would have eagerly grasped the $10,000 offer at any stage. Id.
17. See Merrit v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1973). Merrit held that bad faith rules come into effect only when a conflict of inter-
est develops between the insurer and the insured. According to Merrit, a conflict of
interest arises only when the insurer is offered a settlement demand equal to or above
the policy limits and the insured is willing to contribute to the settlement out of his
own pocket. Id. at 869, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
18. 50 Cal. 2d at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
19. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
20. Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18. In addition to the availabil-
ity of compensatory damages, that is, the excess amount over the policy limits, dam-
ages for mental suffering became available in Crisci. These include damages from
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ment above the policy limit stand as the highest amount
which a successful bad faith plaintiff could recover. Now,
plaintiffs could also recover for their mental suffering caused
by the bad faith refusal to settle by the insurer.2 1 Crisci's test
in determining bad faith was whether a prudent insurer with-
out policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.2
Three cases following Crisci established that these rules
also applied to first party bad faith actions by the insured
against the insurer for denying coverage under the terms of
the policy.2 3 In 1970, Fletcher v. Western National Life In-
surance Co." held an insurer liable in tort for a refusal to in-
demnify its insured under a disability policy. The court
awarded damages for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress to the insured. Fletcher extended the Crisci rule of
good faith and fair dealing to situations involving questions
regarding the insured's coverage.25 Fletcher, however, like
other bad faith decisions failed to articulate a definitive char-
acterization of what is bad faith. Bad faith, nonetheless, was
used to describe the insurer's conduct, which was conceded to
be "outrageous. "26
An attempt was made in Richardson v. Employer's Lia-
bility Assurance Corp.2 to throw some light on the meaning
of bad faith. The court approached the issue in regard to pu-
nitive damages in a coverage denial case, and held that the
basis for these damages would be limited to proof of malice
and oppression.2 Although Richardson characterized oppres-
sion by articulating its statutory meaning, it stated that actual
malice could be inferred from the circumstances of the case.'
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, humiliation, shock and indignity.
21. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
22. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
23. Third party bad faith cases typically involve the insurer's duty to accept
reasonable settlement demands in handling the claims of third parties against the
insured under a liability insurance policy. First party bad faith actions generally in-
volve the insurer's duty not to withold unreasonably the payments due under a pol-
icy. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973) for a good discussion of this distinction.
24. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
25. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
26. Id. at 408, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 99. Fletcher also found that Western National's
motive for engaging in such conduct was to save itself [Western National] $50,000.
The conduct was found to be premeditated, continuous, and persistent.
27. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
28. Id. at 245-46, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
29. Malice may be inferred circumstantially, but the burden of proof still ap-
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The third case extending bad faith to first party actions
was Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.3 0 in which the insurer
denied fire insurance coverage to the insured because the in-
sured was suspected of arson. Gruenberg articulated the test
as "the duty of an insurer to act in good faith and fairly in
handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty not to with-
hold unreasonably payments due under a policy."3' The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded in Gruenberg that the analy-
sis of first and third party liability in bad faith involved two
aspects of the same duty of good faith and fair dealing.32
Excessive punitive damage awards soon became a pre-
dominant fear for insurers in bad faith actions. In Wetherbee
v. United Insurance Co. of America,33 a jury awarded
$500,000 in punitive damages and only $1,050 in compensa-
tory damages to an insured who successfully contended that
her insurer fraudulently portrayed the benefits of a health
and accident policy. Although the $500,000 award was later
reduced to $200,000, there was a clear indication that no fixed
ratio of compensatory to exemplary damages was necessary or
useful in future punitive damage consideration. 4 In fact, the
$200,000 award was suggested to be reasonable, as represent-
ing less than one week's after-tax income of the insurer.
The magnitude of difficulties encountered by insurers in
avoiding bad faith was dramatically heightened in Johansen
v. California State Automobile Association.6 In Johansen,
the California Supreme Court intimated that it was willing to
establish strict liability as the standard of assessing insurer
liability in bad faith. Johansen stated that an insurer's erro-
pears to be quite high. In Richardson, malice was found after it was shown that the
insurance agents handling the insured's claim forced the claim into arbitration even
though they knew the claim was completely valid. Id.
30. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
31. Id. at 573, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
32. See supra note 23.
33. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
34. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. United States Ins. Co. of Am., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266,
271, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971).
35. Id.
36. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). The claimant, injured
in a collison with an automobile owned by insureds, brought an action against the
insurer for the unpaid portion of judgment rendered against insureds, including an
amount in excess of the policy limits. The insured had assigned his rights against the
insurer in exchange for a promise to release him from personal liability on the out-
standing judgment. Id.
1983] 923
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neous belief in "noncoverage affords no defense from liability
flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a reasonable set-
tlement offer."'8 7 Johansen based this proposal on an interpre-
tation of Crisci and a general review of the trend in insurer
liability since the Comunale decision. 8 Johansen indicated
that the Crisci reasonableness test may be met merely by a
settlement offer presented to the insurer within the policy
limits.8 " Johansen, however, did not resolve the question of
absolute liability for a refusal to settle whenever an offer was
made within the policy limits. The question still remains to be
resolved in California.
A unanimous California Supreme Court in Murphy v.
Allstate Insurance Co.40 held that the insurer's duty to settle
runs to the insured, and not to the third party claimant ab-
sent an assignment.4 1 This was the identical issue presented to
the California Supreme Court in Royal Globe.
III. Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court
Ruth Koeppel slipped and fell in a food market and in-
curred personal injuries as a result of her fall. Koeppel filed a
complaint against the market seeking damages for her inju-
ries, physical and emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Also named as defendants were Royal Globe Insurance Co.,
the issuer of the market's liability policy, and Robert Hunt,
an independent adjusting company alleged to be Royal
Globe's agent.42 The complaint alleged that Royal Globe vio-
lated section 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code"8 in that it
37. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292. Although the trial judge
found that a bona fide belief in adjustment of the settlement offer would be sufficient
to preclude bad faith, the California Supreme Court held that "'[a]n insurer who
denies coverage does so at its own risk' regardless of the certainty of his position."
Id. at 15, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (emphasis added) (quoting Comunale
v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 202).
38. Johansen, 15 Cal. 3d at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292. Accepting
the Crisci reasonableness language, Johansen stated that a belief in a policy's lack of
coverage, or a desire to reduce the amount of future settlements should be indepen-
dent of a determination of the settlement offer's reasonableness.
39. Id.
40. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). See also Shapero v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971).
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 941, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
42. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 884, 592 P.2d 329,
331-32, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844-45 (1979).
43. Id. See supra note 6.
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had refused to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt,
fair, and equitable settlement of Koeppel's claim against the
market, even though liability had become reasonably clear.
The complaint also alleged that Hunt had advised Koeppel
not to obtain the services of an attorney in violation of section
790.03(h)(14)."
Defendant Royal Globe demurred to the complaint and
sought a dismissal on three grounds: First, that the California
Insurance Commissioner has the exclusive power to enforce
the Act; second, that a third party has no standing to bring
such an insured's action because the Act was intended to pro-
tect only the interests of the insured; and third, that a plain-
tiff cannot sue the insurer and the insured in the same law-
suit.45 The trial court overruled the demurrer and Royal
Globe's petition to the California Supreme Court for a writ of
mandate was granted. The court specifically held that a third
claimant may sue an insurer for violating section 790.03(h)(5)
and (14), but that the third party's suit may not be brought
until the action between the injured party and the insured is
concluded.46
Section 790.03(h)(5), the basis for the Royal Globe deci-
sion, provides that an insurer will be liable for consciously
failing to attempt "in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlements of claims upon which liability has be-
come reasonably clear" as part of a general business prac-
tice.47 Section 790.03(h)(5) can be characterized as the court's
test for bad faith. However, the court gave no indication of
how or in what situations to apply this criterion.
The court held that an individual litigant could bring a
private cause of action to impose civil liability on insurers for
violating section 790.03.48 The court read the Act in its en-
tirety and found language in section 790.09 to support its po-
sition that the Commissioner did not possess the sole author-
ity to enforce the Act: "Section 790.09 provides that a cease
and desist order issued by the commissioner under the provi-
sions of the act shall not absolve an insurer from 'civil liabil-
ity. . . under the laws of this State arising out of the meth-
44. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See supra note 6.
45. 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
46. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
47. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5). See supra note 6.
48. 23 Cal. 3d at 885-87, 592 P.2d at 332-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-47.
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ods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive.' "4 The
court also relied on first party bad faith cases which had inter-
preted the Act to allow for a private cause of action to enforce
provisions of the Act. 0
The court then addressed the issue of the insurer's duty.
Notwithstanding Murphy, which had held that the insurer's
duty to settle runs only to its insured, the Royal Globe court
held that the insurer owes a third party a direct duty to settle
a claim in good faith.' Murphy was reconciled simply by
holding that Murphy was based on contractual principles,
while Royal Globe is based on statutory principles.52
Finally, Royal Globe held that a single instance of unfair
conduct by an insurer as specified in section 790.03(h), was
sufficient for a cause of action in bad faith. 3 Subdivision (h)
provides that an insurer will be liable for "knowingly commit-
ing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of [a number of enumerated] unfair
claims settlement practices." The result of the Royal Globe
holding is that liability could be imposed either by proof of
repetitive prohibited acts or evidence of deliberate miscon-
49. Id. at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (emphasis added by the
court). California Insurance Code § 790.09 provides:
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any
person or subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce
the same shall in any way relieve or absolve such person from any ad-
ministrative action against the license or certificate of such person, civil
liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State arising out of
the methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972).
50. See Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d
978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978) (private cause of action found under section 790.09
preventing defendant insurance company from charging plaintiff higher than agreed
upon premium); Shernopp v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1975) (in class action for damages against title insurers, court allowed to award
money damages for past injuries under section 790.03); Greenberg v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973) (private cause of
action found under section 790.03(c), which prohibits coercion by an insurer resulting
in unreasonable restraint of the business of insurance).
51. 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847. The court picked
out particular language in subdivision (h) of section 790.03 and found the word
"claimant" mentioned in sections (h)(1), (h)(14), and (h)(15). Because the word "in-
sureds" appeared concurrently in other provisions of section (h) (i.e., (h)(6),(h)(7),
(h)(10) and (h)(11)), the Royal Globe court concluded that the purpose of legisla-
tively including claimants in the statute was to afford them with direct protection
against insurers.
52. Id. at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
53. Id. at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
[Vol. 23
BAD FAITH
duct on merely one occasion.
Ironically, the insurer won the case. The court concluded
that because a plaintiff may not sue both insurer and the in-
sured in the same lawsuit, the writ of mandate should be is-
sued and the trial court be directed to vacate its orders and
enter judgment on the pleadings for defendant Royal Globe.
IV. AFTERMATH OF Royal Globe
The court in Royal Globe did not need to analyze factu-
ally whether or not defendant Royal Globe was in fact guilty
of bad faith; it merely held it could be liable provided the
statutory criteria of the Act were met. No court has applied
the statutory criteria since Royal Globe. However, Royal
Globe has been recognized by a handful of appellate courts
which did not find it necessary to utilize the nascent statutory
criteria for bad faith findings.
A. Cases
An overview of the utilization of Royal Globe by Califor-
nia courts reveals a hesitancy to do anything with the case
except to acknowledge its presence by cursory approval.
The court in Delos v. Farmers Insurance Group Inc."
followed Royal Globe in holding that a single instance of un-
fair conduct pursuant to section 790.03(h) permits a private
cause of action. Delos involved an action by an insured
against his insurer for a bad faith refusal to pay an uninsured
motorist claim made by the insured. Delos held that the in-
surer "is liable" for breaching the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and it "may" be liable under section
790.03.55 The common law liability argument took precedent
and was fully developed; the reference to Royal Globe and the
Act was superfluous.
Doser v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co."0 addressed
the timing problem of when a cause of action against an in-
54. 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979).
55. Id. at 650, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
56. 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1980). In Doser, the alleged assign-
ees of an estate brought a bad faith action against the insurer. The assignees were
heirs of a passenger killed in a plane crash. A wrongful death action was brought
against the beneficiaries of the pilot's estate. After an offer to settle was made to the
pilot estate's insurer, assignees brought a bad faith action. The court dismissed the
action because the original action was still pending.
19831
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surer arises for a third party claimant. Doser acknowledged
that under Royal Globe the third party's suit may not be
brought until an action between the injured party and the in-
sured is "concluded. '8 7 Subsequently, Nationwide Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court" held that Royal Globe envisioned that
this "conclusion" could only have had reference to a final de-
termination, a "final judgment."85 This holding, however, was
then undercut in Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co.,e0 where the court found the "final judgment" language to
be a misstatement of this aspect of the Royal Globe decision."
Rodriguez held that a third party's acceptance of a statutory
offer to compromise followed by a dismissal with prejudice of
the third party's underlying action against the insured oper-
ated as a "conclusion" of the third party's action against the
insured.2 Rodriguez, therefore, has extended the reach of
Royal Globe to settled cases.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Avalos" addressed the
question of whether an automobile insurer acted in bad faith
by paying a policy limit settlement of $15,000 to an injured
passenger of the insured vehicle when a potential wrongful
death claim by the driver's estate also existed. Avalos held
that no violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
existed under common law authority. Footnoting Royal Globe,
Avalos stated that a statutory cause of action would have ex-
isted if the insurer did not "try in good faith to make a
prompt, fair and equitable settlement [of the] personal injury
claim." '64
Perhaps the most important and detrimental decision to
insurers since Royal Globe is Colonial Life & Accident Insur-
ance Co. v. Superior Court.6 5 In Colonial, the California Su-
preme Court stated that the Unfair Practices Act and Royal
57. Id. at 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 120. See Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592
P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
58. 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982).
59. Id. at 714, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
60. 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983).
61. Id. at 53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
62. Id. at 54, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
63. 114 Cal. App. 3d 49, 170 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1980).
64. Id. at 58 n.5, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 532 n.5. The Avalos court noted that an
insurer cannot prudently wait to see if the individual severely injured by its insured
dies. Id.
65. 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647 P.2d at 86, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1982).
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Globe indicate that a plantiff can establish a bad faith claim
by showing either that the insurer knowingly committed a
harmful act or was frequently engaged in such acts, constitut-
ing a general business practice." Therefore, the plaintiff's dis-
covery aimed at determining the frequency of the alleged un-
fair settlement practices was permitted because it was likely
to produce evidence directly relevant to the claim. 7
An attempt to limit Royal Globe was made by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Avila v. Traveler's Insurance
Co. " Avila involved a third party claim that the insurer had
committed unfair settlement practices and was guilty of bad
faith in its failure to settle an underlying wrongful death ac-
tion. Although it expressed its hesitancy in construing what it
called a "novel question of state law," the Ninth Circuit held
that third party claimants do not have standing to bring a
cause of action based upon section 790.03(h)(3). ' Moreover,
Avila held that Royal Globe should not apply retroactively.70
While Royal Globe specifically held that a third party claim-
ant could sue an insurer directly for violations of section
790.03(h)(5) and (h)(14), it was unclear whether the Royal
Globe decision encompassed the entire Act. Avila specifically
took section 790.03(h)(3) out of the Royal Globe holding.
Two recent appellate court cases refused to extend Royal
Globe liability to worker's compensation insurance carriers.7 1
In Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co.,7 2 a worker's compensation
claimant brought an action against his former employer's
worker's compensation insurance carrier alleging that the car-
rier had refused, after a seven-month delay, to pay a medical
claim submitted by the claimant. The claimant framed his
66. Id. at 791, 647 P.2d at 90, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
67. Id.
68. 651 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 659. Section 790.03(h)(3) provides that an insurer can be liable for
"[flailing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims arising under insurance policies." See supra note 6.
70. 651 F.2d at 659.
71. See also Palmer v. R.L. Kautz & Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 155, 190 Cal. Rptr.
139 (1983); Cervantes v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 763, 189 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1983); Johnson v. Archie Threats, 140 Cal. App. 3d 287, 189 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1983).
72. 132 Cal. App. 3d 886, 183 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1982). The insured suffered a back
injury in the course and scope of his employment in 1969. Shortly afterwards he
moved across the country. After the insurer had paid the insured for recurrences of
the injury for six years, it terminated payments. The insured then brought a bad
faith action.
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complaint, in part, by alleging that the carrier had violated
section 790.03(h)(2), (4), (5), and (13)." The court, however,
never reached the Royal Globe issue because it held that the
claimant's exclusive remedy was under the worker's compen-
sation act. Similarly, in Depew v. Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co.,74 an injured worker who had been awarded
worker's compensation benefits brought a section 790.03 ac-
tion against the worker's compensation insurance carrier for
its alleged failure to pay the benefits awarded. Depew held
that the provisions of the Insurance Code were inapplicable to
the worker's case and that the claim was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board.
Since Royal Globe was decided in 1979, no California
court has been presented with Royal Globe facts: a third party
claimant bringing a direct action against an insurer, without
an assignment, pursuant to section 790.03(h)(5). The cases de-
cided after Royal Globe illustrate the desire to acknowledge
the decision's presence; however, the acknowledgement has
not been extended past a general approval. Avila, a Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals case, attempted to delineate Royal
Globe; but, after recognizing the issue as a "novel question of
state law," it hesitated to comment further.
B. Problems
Royal Globe presents the following problems: (1) It does
not provide guidelines for an insurer to follow in order to
avoid bad faith; (2) Royal Globe's interpretation of the Act
creates a series of constitutional problems; (3) it does not ex-
plicity provide a clear, useful test to determine bad faith; and
(4) Royal Globe fails to establish mutuality in the duties owed
to third parties by insurers.
1. Lack of General Guidelines
Bad faith litigation has developed extensively over the
past twenty-five years in California based on traditional com-
mon law principles of contract and tort. Before Royal Globe,
insurers were not specifically guided by the courts in deter-
mining what constituted bad faith; yet, the precedent was
73. Id. at 891 n.1, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 505 n.1. See supra note 6.
74. 135 Cal. App. 3d 574, 185 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1982).
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concrete, and traditional legal arguments were available if the
insurer believed that factually its case did not merit an action
in bad faith. Relying solely on the Unfair Practices Act, Royal
Globe threatens to extinguish the past twenty-five years of
case law regarding bad faith. Since its inception in 1972, the
Act has rarely been relied upon by courts and claimants in
bad faith actions against insurers. Gradually, a few cases came
down which held that the Act was available as a private rem-
edy for insureds in a first party action against their insurers.75
This was not very alarming due to the protection already af-
forded the insured under traditional contract and expansive
tort theories which may not be available under Royal Globe.7 6
2. Constitutional Problems
The California Supreme Court's interpretation of the Un-
fair Practices Act in Royal Globe raises a host of constitu-
tional problems. First, the Act as interpreted is subject to a
due process attack for vagueness. Second, it deprives an in-
surer of the right to jury trial. And third, the right to contract
is effectively impaired by creating a conflict of interest be-
tween the insurance company and the insured. These
problems are very illustrative of the practical difficulties in-
surers are faced with by the Royal Globe decision.
a. Due Process- Vagueness
Vague statutes are often supplied specificity if reference
to a standard of practice in the particular profession can be
made or by the common knowledge of the members of the
particular vocation." But this specificity is not available in
the Royal Globe context because there is no standard of prac-
tice regarding third party statutory bad faith actions in the
insurance industry. As demonstrated above there is a lack of
interpretation of Royal Globe and the Act by the California
courts. This hesitancy is suggestive of the lack of understand-
ing of the true meaning of the Act and the Royal Globe
decision.
75. See supra note 50.
76. See supra notes 8 and 17 regarding the objective standards the court has
formulated for the insurer to measure its conduct to prevent bad faith.
77. See, e.g., Beach v. Western Medical Examiners, 116 Cal. App. 3d 153, 162,
171 Cal. Rptr. 846, 851 (1981).
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Civil statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to
provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct, as well as
establish a standard of conduct which can be uniformly inter-
preted by administrative agencies and the judiciary. 8 If a law
forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, it does
not comport with due process. 79 A serious question of vague-
ness is presented as the insurance companies continue to
guess at the Act's meaning, as interpreted by Royal Globe.
b. Right to Jury Trial
Article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution pro-
vides that "[trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all . . . ."8o The right to a jury trial is a basic and
fundamental aspect of both the state and federal systems of
jurisprudence. 81 The right has always been regarded as sacred
and has been jealously guarded by the courts.8 2
In the aftermath of Royal Globe, the right to jury trial,
although not explicitly denied, is effectively discouraged and,
in effect, denied. The Royal Globe decision inhibits the right
to jury trial, by exposing the insurer to a second suit by the
third party claimant if the insurer chooses not to settle the
claim and exercises its right to litigate the claim at trial. This
can be illustrated by the following example. Assume there is a
car accident between B and C. C incurs personal injuries and
sues B for $25,000. B is insured by A for $10,000 under an
automobile liability policy, pursuant to which A assumes the
defense of B in the lawsuit. C presents A and B with a settle-
ment offer of $10,000. However, A's investigators and B's ac-
count of the accident reveal potentially strong defense argu-
78. See People v. Sangiacomo, 128 Cal. App. 3d 942, 953, 180 Cal. Rptr. 594,
601 (1982); United Business Comm'n v. San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 176, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 263, 276 (1979); Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agencies, 64 Cal. App. 3d 482,
491, 138 Cal. Rptr. 725, 729 (1976); McMurty v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180
Cal. App. 2d 760, 766, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910, 914 (1960).
79. See, e.g., People v. Sangiacomo, 128 Cal. App. 3d 942, 954, 180 Cal. Rptr.
594, 602 (1982); McMurty v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760,
766, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910, 913-14 (1960). See generally 5 B. WITKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 15.1, 15.2 (1974).
80. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
81. See Lofy v. Southern Pac., 129 Cal. App. 2d 459, 277 P.2d 423 (1954).
82. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287 n.1, 231 P.2d 832,
835 n.1 (1951).
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ments, such as contributory negligence by C, due to his failure
to wear a seatbelt. Assume further, that a crucial issue in this
case is a factual one-whether B or C ran a redlight immedi-
ately prior to the accident. This factual dispute must be re-
solved by a jury if no other concrete indication of guilt is dis-
covered before the trial. But A is faced with a dilemma: the
odds are fifty-fifty that the jury will accept the theory that C,
not B, ran the red light. If A decides to try his case and wins,
C will potentially receive nothing or at least less than the
$25,000 prayer or the $10,000 settlement offer. If A loses, and
the jury reward is in excess of the policy limit, A could be
subject to a second lawsuit in bad faith, brought by C, due to
A's refusal to accept the settlement offer made by C. The
strong possibility exists that A will not only be required to
pay the excess judgment, but also punitive damages to C, re-
gardless of the validity of A's belief in his legal theories in the
first lawsuit between B and C.
Because there exists no concrete standard to judge A's
potential liablity under the statutory bad faith cause of ac-
tion, A will more often than not choose to accept the initial
settlement offer of $10,000 rather than risk unlimited liability
in bad faith. It is fundamental that the law favors settle-
ment.8 The distinction, however, between favoring and forc-
ing settlement may be a fine line. Royal Globe's interpretation
of the Act imposes a strong obligation on an insurer to settle
third party claims against its insured. On balance, the
probability of succeeding at trial probably does not outweigh
the potential risk of future sanctions for an insurer. Royal
Globe, therefore, restricts the insurer's right to jury trial.
c. Right to Contract
Article I, section 9 of the California Constitution provides
that a "[law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be
passed." '84
In the example above, a conflict of interest emerges for A,
the insurer, once he is presented with C's settlement offer of
$10,000, the policy limit. A's primary duty under the insur-
83. See, e.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 696, 319 P.2d
69, 79 (1957).
84. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ance contract is to B, its insured. 5 However, this obligation is
impaired by Royal Globe because it gives C, the injured third
party, a direct action against A if A does not attempt to settle
a dispute between B and C in good faith. As a result, the
rights of C (the stranger) are elevated above those of B (the
insured) because A (the insurer) has a greater fear of subse-
quent litigation with C than the protection of B's rights under
the insurance contract. The statutory creation of a private
right of action favoring strangers to the insurance contract di-
rectly interferes with the rights and obligations of the parties
to the contract.
Royal Globe creates an interesting irony. The develop-
ment of bad faith law in California has uniformly restricted
the powers of insurance companies and conversely, the rights
of the insureds have been expanded and protected. Royal
Globe, at first glance, can be characterized as fitting into this
general trend. Royal Globe has, however, actually destroyed
the basic right of the insured to contract by advancing the
rights of third parties who are not even part of the insurance
contract.
Assume, once again, that we are in a situation as posed by
the example above, and that C has just presented A and B
with the settlement offer of $10,000. We discussed A's con-
cerns, which would persuade A to accept the offer notwith-
standing his belief in the strength of his defense theories. But
as noted, A's primary duty under the contract runs to B. In
this case B may desire to litigate the case and not accept the
settlement offer in an effort to have his driving record cleared,
maintain his good name, and ultimately keep his insurance
premium at its existing rate. A should be able to afford B this
paramount right of protection before considering the rights of
third parties.
The above discussion of the constitutional problems cre-
ated by Royal Globe is useful not only for the substantive
questionability of that case on constitutional grounds, but also
as a vehicle to demonstrate a few of the practical problems
which have developed since that case was decided.
85. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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3. The Royal Globe Test for Bad Faith
Commentators have suggested that the test to be applied
to determine bad faith under Royal Globe is derived specifi-
cally from the language of section 790.03(h)(5). 6 The lan-
guage of this section translates into a two part test: (1) lia-
bility on a claim must have become reasonably clear; and
(2) the insurer did not make a good faith effort to effectuate
a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of the claim." The
following sections will analyze the language of this test in
terms of what these words have come to mean in the non-
statutory sense of bad faith litigation.
a. Reasonably Clear Liability
Royal Globe does not define "reasonably clear" as it ap-
pears section 790.03(h)(5). The notion of reasonably clear lia-
bility is a prerequisite to an insurer's duty to undertake settle-
ment negotiations in good faith. Cases after Royal Globe have
also failed to define applicable criteria to determine reasona-
bly clear liability.
Reasonably clear liability has been characterized as an in-
dication of the particular stage in the settlement process at
which the duty to settle arises.8 8 On the other hand, it may be
an indication of the required amount of evidence possessed by
the insurer that mandates the insurer to attempt settlement.89
The insurer's relationship with its claims and adjustment
officers presents one concern in determining when liability is
reasonably clear. Suppose the claims officer makes a prelimi-
nary evaluation of "potential" or "probable" liability-is this
characterization commensurate with legal liability? Probably
not, due to defense theories such as comparative and contrib-
utory negligence. Nevertheless, the claims officer's report be-
comes part of the file and will no doubt be discovered by the
claimant.90
The point in time at which "reasonably clear" liability
must be ascertained is yet another question of concern. It has
86. See generally Wagenseil, Royal Globe: Reasonably Unclear Liability for In-
surers, 1979 INs. L.J. 377; Comment, A Statutory Action for Bad Faith-The Rea-
sonably Clear Remedy for the Third Party Claimant, 11 PAC. L.J. 945, 953 (1980).
87. See generally Wagenseil, supra note 86.
88. See Comment, supra note 86.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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been suggested that the statutory duty to settle does not arise
until after the investigative stage of the claims settlement pro-
cess is complete.9 1 Does this mean prior to the taking of depo-
sitions, or the review of medical records? 92 There is no clear
and simple answer. In fact, it remains questionable whether or
not an attorney must be consulted before the requirement of
reasonably clear liability may take effect.
Prior to Royal Globe, the courts dealt with notions of
"probable cause" in determining whether or not an insurer's
denial of claims was reasonable.9 3 The withholding of insur-
ance proceeds without "proper" or "probable cause" would
constitute prima facie evidence of bad faith. Initially, Com-
munale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. stated that set-
tlement would be most reasonable when the insurer faced a
"great risk of recovery beyond those policy limits." 9' In Critz
v. Farmers Insurance Group, the insurer's claims agents had
written two reports, the first of which stated that "[t]his ap-
pears to be an obvious case of liability . . . . " The Critz
court found no difficulty in holding that the settlement offer
refused by the insurer was reasonable, especially in light of
the liability standpoint of these reports and the damages sus-
tained by the claimant.'6
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. has been widely credited
for articulating the reasonableness standard. Crisci's facts in-
dicated that the insurer's chances of preventing the claimant
from receiving a judgment well in excess of the policy limits
depended on the discovery of very speculative evidence.9 7 Al-
though the evidence was not discovered, the insurer continued
its defense. The resulting jury verdict was well in excess of the
policy limits and the insurer was found liable in bad faith for
its unreasonable refusal to accept the claimant's settlement
offer within the policy limits.' 8 In Merrit v. Reserve Insurance
Co.," however, insurers escaped liability by relying on the in-
91. See supra note 88 and accompaning text.
92. See Wagenseil, supra note 86, at 376-77.
93. See Comment, supra note 86, at 958.
94. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
95. 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 793, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1964).
96. Id. See supra note 16.
97. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 428, 426 P.2d 173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1967).
98. Id.
99. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973). See supra note 17 and ac-
companying text.
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vestigative reports of their officers and attorneys which ad-
vised the insurer that the case was "an absolute case of non-
liability."'00
Finally, Johansen v. California State Automobile Associ-
ation held an insurer liable in bad faith even though the trial
court found that the insurer had a bona fide belief that the
insured's claim was not covered under the terms of the pol-
icy. 10' Johansen stated that the insurer recognized that liabil-
ity in excess of the policy clearly existed if the insured's claim
was covered by the policy.' Johansen suggested the better
approach for the insurer would have been to accept the rea-
sonable settlement offer, then establish the noncoverage of the
policy issue, and finally seek reimbursement of the settlement
from its insured. 08
The application of common law principles to the meaning
of "reasonably clear liability" suggests that "reasonably clear"
will not be very difficult to establish. The cases prior to Royal
Globe indicate that investigative reports that establish the in-
surer's liability as "obvious" or "clear" will probably be suffi-
cient to meet the standard of "reasonably clear liability." In
addition, the objective determination of the damages involved
in the case may also be sufficient to establish "reasonably
clear liability."' 0 4 These remain, however, mere speculations
due to the absence of a court determination of the meaning of
"reasonably clear liability" since Royal Globe.
b. Good Faith Attempt to Settle
According to Royal Globe once liability is shown to have
been reasonably clear, the plaintiff must establish that the in-
surer violated its duty to attempt in good faith to effectuate a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim.'0 5 Courts
after Royal Globe have not evaluated bad faith claims under
this language; instead they have utilized the common law
standards developed prior to Royal Globe.'0
First and third party bad faith actions have been recog-
100. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 864-65, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 515. See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
101. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 14, 538 P.2d 744, 747, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1975).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
104. See supra note 16.
105. See Comment, supra note 86, at 961.
106. See supra notes 55 and 64 and accompanying text.
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nized as dealing with two aspects of the same duty of good
faith and fair dealing:107 The third party test imposes a duty
upon the insurer to accept reasonable settlement offers by
claimants, and the first party test requires the insurer to act
in good faith in handling the claim of its insured.'0 5 The de-
terminative factor in both the first and third party cases is
reasonableness. As discussed above, Crisci and its successors
articulated the test to determine good faith as whether a pru-
dent insurer acting without policy limits would have accepted
the settlement offer.'0 9
In the third party context, it is clear that mere negligence
will not be considered unreasonable enough to constitute bad
faith in the insurer." 0 Therefore, it is unlikely that a court
today would find an insurer liable in bad faith when there is
only a mere possibility that the insurer's settlement refusal
might result in damage to the claimant."'
The reasonableness language was interpreted very strictly
in Johansen."2 Johansen implied that insurers could be
strictly liable for refusing a settlement offer within the policy
limits. A subsequent jury verdict in favor of the claimant in
excess of the policy coverage would afford the refused settle-
ment offer an inference of reasonableness. Consequently, the
insurer would be per se liable in bad faith for its refusal of the
reasonable offer." 3 Johansen has not been followed by the
California courts; however, its suggestion combined with the
undefined nature of Royal Globe creates an uneasiness for in-
surers speculating about the specificity of the Royal Globe
test.
4. Mutuality
Royal Globe does not impose upon the third party claim-
ants any similar duty to act fairly and in good faith in the
settlement process as it does on insurers. Consequently, third
107. See supra notes 23 and 32 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
109. 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See supra notes 19-
22 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. See also Doser v. Middlesex
Mutual Ins. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115, 119-20 (1980).
111. Id.
112. Johansen v. California State Automobile Ass'n, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
113. 15 Cal. 3d at 15, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
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party claimants are equipped with a unilateral weapon in the
settlement process by making demands114 upon the insurer
without the fear of reprimand should the demand be found
unreasonable. The need to impose a mutual obligation of good
faith and fair dealing seems inherently fair and is discussed as
a proposal in this comment.
V. PROPOSALS
A. Test For Statutory Bad Faith
The bulk of the problems encountered by insurers are di-
rectly related to lack of direction resulting from the Royal
Globe decision. It is conceivable that the California Supreme
Court believed that a factual application and development of
the nascent statutory authority would soon follow the Royal
Globe decision. No court has made such an attempt. In fact,
the trend since Royal Globe has been to evaluate the bad faith
claim consistently with the well developed common law prin-
ciples of contract and tort.
If Royal Globe is correlative to common law principles,
then Royal Globe's test to determine bad faith should be that
of the developed common law doctrine of California bad faith.
Currently in California, negligence alone does not constitute
bad faith and the development of strict liability principles has
not extended past one forceful suggestion in Johansen. Never-
theless, the test in California for bad faith still appears to be
grounded in terms of reasonableness. Exemplary bad faith
damages are only available against insurers if it can be shown
that in addition to acting unreasonably, the insurer acted with
malice and oppression in denying the insured's or third party
claim. 115
The ambiguity of the Royal Globe decision, and the diffi-
culty in the interpretation of phrases such as "reasonably
clear liability" and "good faith attempts to settle" indicate
the need for greater definition for insurers. Therefore, the test
in Royal Globe should be governed by common law principles,
since no court has attempted to characterize the statutory
cause of action differently from the common law cause of ac-
114. See, e.g., Levine and Patrick, Bad Faith Litigation-1982, A Bar Ass'n of
San Francisco Program.
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
1983] 939
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion in bad faith.
The key to the common law test for bad faith is the re-
quirement that the third party secure an assignment of the
insured's rights against the insurer. Royal Globe explicitly re-
jected the need for such an assignment under the statutory
cause of action in bad faith. " 6 However, the lack of case law
implementing Royal Globe together with Royal Globe's ques-
tionable reasoning for not requiring an assignment, suggests a
need for reconsideration on this issue.
Royal Globe was decided by a margin of four to three. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson was not convinced
of the majority's distinction between the statutory cause of
action and the holding in Murphy that an insurer's duty to
settle runs to the insured and not to the injured party.'17
Royal Globe's majority did not disapprove of Murphy; it sim-
ply held that it was inapplicable due to the statutory author-
ity of the Act which allowed a direct action by the third party
absent an assignment. " 8 The majority reached this conclusion
basically under two theories: (1) Section 790.09 of the Act af-
forded claimants a private cause of action; and (2) the legisla-
tive intent of the Act was to afford third party claimants a
private cause of action directly against an insurer.
The dissent believed that section 790.09 "preserved"
rather than "created" new liability under existing state law. " 9
Justice Richardson criticized the majority's reliance on Green-
berg v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.'20 which in his words stated
only that "the fair construction [of section 790.09] is that the
person to whom the civil liability runs may enforce it by an
appropriate action."'12' In third party actions, the "person to
whom civil liability runs" was unanimously decided in Mur-
phy to be the insured.
22
Although section 790.03(h)(5) does not contain the word
"claimants," the court in Royal Globe concluded that it "ap-
116. 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
117. Id. at 893, 592 P.2d at 338, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See also notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
118. 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
119. Id. at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
120. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
121. 23 Cal. 3d at 898, 592 P.2d at 340, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
122. Id. at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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pears "123 to cover both claimants and insureds. The majority
reasoned that when subsection (h) was added to the Act in
1972, a representative of the Department of Insurance testi-
fied before various legislative committees that the measure
"could be construed to affect third parties" and since "nobody
argued against that position," the committee's inaction repre-
sented a deliberate decision that third party claimants were
included under the protection of subsection (h) of the Act.1 24
This comment proposes that the need for a proper formal
assignment by the insured to the third party claimant of the
insured's rights against the insurer be reconsidered as a re-
quirement under the Act. Royal Globe, however, is the law in
California. If Royal Globe was decided in order to afford
claimants greater protection against unscrupulous insurance
companies, then its purpose is meritorious. If we assume that
Royal Globe does not add substantively to present common
law bad faith analysis, Royal Globe should be made an excep-
tion to the common law. This exception of allowing private
third party rights against the insurer without an assignment
from the insured would only be available if the third party
can prove that the insurer's conduct was more than unreason-
able, that is, the insurer acted in conscious disregard for the
claimant's rights during settlement.
This proposal can be illustrated by reference to Depew v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.' 25 which denied the ex-
tension of section 790.03 actions to worker's compensation
claims. In holding that the Worker's Compensation Appeals
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim, the court
stated that an exception exists when, and if, the worker can
prove that the insurance carrier intentionally committed out-
rageous and extreme conduct in the investigation of the
worker's claim. If the worker successfully proves the prohib-
ited conduct, he has a remedy in common law and potentially
statutory bad faith.
Depew illustrates the mechanics of this comment's propo-
sal. Third party actions in bad faith would be under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the common law, which would require
the acquisition of a valid assignment before the third party
123. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
124. Id. at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
125. 135 Cal. App. 3d 574, 185 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1982).
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could proceed against the insurer. However, if the third party
can prove the insurer's conduct was "outrageous and ex-
treme," or specifically, in conscious disregard of the third
party's rights in settlement, then the statutory cause of action
would be available.
A roadblock to this proposal, seemingly, exists in the lan-
guage of section 790.03(h)(5) of the Act. Subdivision (h)(5) of
790.03 speaks in terms of reasonableness and good faith, with
no indication that a higher finding of bad faith is required to
be proved. However, subsection (h) has language that forces
claimants and insureds to show that the insurer's acts in bad
faith were done "knowingly" or constituted a "general busi-
ness practice." This infers a higher proof standard than
merely showing that the insurer acted unreasonably. There-
fore, perhaps the Act should be reconsidered in terms of an
explicit amendment which incorporates language to the effect
that the insurer's "knowing" conduct must be shown to be in
conscious disregard for the the claimant's rights. Otherwise,
the interpretation of this language by the Royal Globe court
might be reconsidered in light of the lack of use the statutory
cause of action has received in California courts.
B. Mutuality
A necessary complement to establishing clear standards
in the statutory bad faith action is to require similar obliga-
tions of good faith and fair dealing be imposed on third party
claimants. Common law notions of good faith and fair dealing
are mutual in the first party context.126 Analogizing these first
party cases to the current state of bad faith in California
strongly suggests that third parties should be required to un-
dertake their settlement negotiations in good faith.
If pre-statutory cases serve as an indicator of what the
good faith standard will be in the statutory context, perhaps
their insight will provide the foundation for this mutuality ar-
gument. Mutuality was initially made explicit in the contrac-
tual context in Comunale, where the court held that in every
insurance contract an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exists that "neither party will do anything which will
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits under the
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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agreement.' ' 27 This principle was widely followed and was ex-
tended to apply to the tort of bad faith. 128
Recent cases continue to embrace this mutuality lan-
guage. 120 In Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star,30
the court stated that the "covenant [of good faith and fair
dealing] is not a one-way street but requires that neither
party-not the insured, nor the insurer-will do anything to
injure the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement."'' 3' This principle was also illustrated by an appel-
late court in Blake v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,' 32 which held
that a claimant is required to present the insurer with an ar-
ticulated theory of why it should receive the insurance pro-
ceeds in dispute.' 3  The basis of this holding was that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing had developed equally
upon the insured or his beneficiary.'""
127. 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
128. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text discussing the application of
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. See also Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452,
521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (action by insured against insurer for bad
faith in insurer's refusal to make medical payments due to insured's pending work-
men's compensation claim in which court accepts the mutual obligations of good faith
and fair dealing). Id. at 460-61, 521 P.2d at 1108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
129. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141,
169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (insurers found liable in bad faith for not properly investi-
gating its insured's claim). See also National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards,
119 Cal. App. 3d 326, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981) (for post-Royal Globe acceptance of
mutuality language).
130. 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979).
131. Id. at 792, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (court held that duty of good faith and fair
dealing was owed to excess insurer by both insured as well as by liability insurer,
which was the primary insurer).
132. 99 Cal. App. 3d 901, 160 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1979).
133. Id. at 925-26, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42. Blake stated that a dispute as to
the cause of death for insurance policy provisions should be resolved at trial with the
burden on the plaintiff to prove cause. It held further that the insurer did not act
unreasonably in taking the position prior to trial that good faith doubts as to whether
the death was an accident or a suicide should be resolved against the claimant. The
insurer could not be held in bad faith because it withheld payments until it could
find out on its own, to a measure of certainty, the validity of the claim. Therefore, the
insurer was found to have met its obligation of good faith to the plaintiff and to its
other policy holders and stockholders not to dissipate its reserves through the pay-
ment of a meritless claim. Id. at 924-25, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42.
134. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789,
139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977) (covenant of good faith extended to third parties who dam-
age insurer's expectation of subrogation). A California trial court recently awarded an
insurer compensatory and punitive damages against an insured and two of its owners
totalling more than $1 million for presenting a fraudulent burglary claim for more
than $450,000. The court rejected the insured's $10 million bad faith claim after the
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The statutory cause of action availed by Royal Globe cur-
rently seems to impose the duty of good faith and fair dealing
upon the third party of the insurer as if the third party as-
sumed the place of the insured in the insurance contract, and
hence the settlement negotiations. 35 It is a logical extension
to state that this implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing should be imposed upon the third party claimant, with the
resulting liability if the third party is found in breach thereof.
This liability should take the form of a civil action by the in-
surer against the third party to strike a balance in ongoing
settlement weapons.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1979, Royal Globe held that a person who is injured by
the alleged negligence of the insured may sue the negligent
party's insurer for certain violations of California Insurance
Code section 790.03, which prohibits insurers from engaging
in enumerated unfair claims settlement practices, though the
third party's suit may not be brought until the liability of the
insured is first determined. Before Royal Globe, a person not
a party to an insurance contract first had to receive an assign-
ment of the insured's rights to proceed directly against the
insurance company, before having a direct action against the
insurance company. The statutory cause of action sanctioned
by Royal Globe did not overrule previous cases in bad faith
which relied on common law principles of contract and tort.
Royal Globe has caused many problems to the insurance
industry. In establishing new law in the area of bad faith, this
unprecedented case failed to accomplish its most important
goal: to define and direct. As a result, the problems continue
to hemorrage and take the form of over-aggressive plaintiff
claimants that assert the equivocality of the decision in a uni-
lateral declaration of beware-or else. The "or else" generally
translates into a bad faith cause of action. Bad faith, however,
jury found that the insured had committed fraud and engaged in false swearing, void-
ing the insurance policy. Orient Handel v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, Los
Angeles Superior Court, Docket No. C280090 (June, 1983) (conversation with attor-
ney Richard B. Wolf, January, 1984).
135. Id. at 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 95. The court articulated the power of contrac-
tual principles and the relationship to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Any action by the insured contrary to the covenant of good faith would certainly lead
to a "garden variety breach of contract."
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is not subject to simple translation or definition, especially in
the statutory sense.
Cases after Royal Globe have failed to define or utilize
the Royal Globe decision. The courts, ironically, have contin-
ued to grasp and utilize the traditional theories of bad faith,
virtually ignoring statutory bad faith. Redefinition is desper-
ately needed.
Royal Globe forces insurance companies and their counsel
to undertake a skillful game of chance. Without clear stan-
dards, reasonableness can be a difficult goal to realize. Rea-
sonable under its most general interpretation connotes objec-
tivity. Defined standards provide objectivity. The absence of
objectivity leads to a subjective guessing game. Insurers and
attorneys alike should not have to guess, for "the gift of
prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals."1 6
William J. Casey
136. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932).
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